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      ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Is the Philips Curve Still Applicable in Today’s Financial Environment? 
The relationship between wage inflation and unemployment, is not only considered by Gali and 
Gambetti (2018:2) to be a “a key link of the relation between prices and economic activity” but 
also regarded as the focus of Phillips (1958) original work, is widely perceived to be at the heart 
of the "twin puzzle.” 
Further they add that, “the failure of wage inflation to respond sufficiently to the tightening of 
the labor market in recent years is generally viewed as one of the main factors behind the 
extremely accommodating monetary policies” at central banks like the Federal Reserve or the 
ECB.” 
Why can some economic indicators still be considered to be applicable and relevant – even in an 
environment where so many advancements and financial instruments have significantly altered the 
financial landscape which existed over the years? 
In particular, why can the Philips Curve still be considered applicable and relevant – with reference 
to wage inflation and productivity? More importantly, what economic indicators can serve to 
provide more reliable indicators of inflationary levels once more temporary elements, as induced 
by import prices, have diminished? 
Key words: exchange rates, inflation targeting, monetary policy, interest rates, Philips Curve, wage 
rate 
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The Wage Growth Puzzle and the Philips Curve Explained: Recent 
Developments 
Jim Di Gabriele and Marianne Ojo1 
 
Introduction 
The Wage Growth Puzzle 
The Philips Curve: Is it Still Applicable in Today’s Financial Environment? 
The relationship between wage inflation and unemployment, is not only considered by Gali and 
Gambetti (2018:2)2 to be a “a key link of the relation between prices and economic activity” but 
also regarded as the focus of Phillips (1958) original work, is widely perceived to be at the heart 
of the "twin puzzle.” 
Further they add that, “the failure of wage inflation to respond sufficiently to the tightening of 
the labor market in recent years is generally viewed as one of the main factors behind the 
extremely accommodating monetary policies” at central banks like the Federal Reserve or the 
ECB.” 
This paper not only highlights why the Philips Curve is still relevant and applicable in the current 
financial environment, but also illustrates those developments that have significantly altered the 
present global financial landscape and which to a large extent, account for some of the inflation 
and wage growth puzzles. 
                                                          
1
 Email: jim@dmcpa.com and marianneojo@hotmail.com 
 
2
 See Jordi, G. and  Gambetti L. (2018). Has the U.S. Wage Phillips Curve Flattened? A Semi-Structural Exploration 
October 2018. Concerns also relating to the fact “that despite wide and persistent fluctuations in unemployment, 
inflation remained surprisingly stable during the same period.”  
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The ensuing section introduces concepts and the background to the topic – highlighting main issues 
and areas to be addressed. More importantly, it accentuates the rationale for, as well as the means 
of addressing and mitigating existing gaps in the literature. 
 
-  
-  
- “The original Phillips curve was drawn as a simple (negative) relationship between unemployment 
and wage growth. It captures the basic forces of demand and supply in the labour market. If demand 
for labour exceeds the supply of labour, the unemployment rate will fall, and this will put upward 
pressure on wage inflation. The following chart reflects such negative relationship between 
unemployment and wage growth in the UK since 2001.”3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 See Bank of England (2018). “From asymmetry to symmetry: changing risks to the economic outlook” Speech 
given by Gertjan Vlieghe, External MPC member, Bank of England Confederation of British Industry, Birmingham 
23rd March 2018   at page 8 
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Source: 4 
Bank of England (2018). “From asymmetry to symmetry: changing risks to the economic outlook” 
De Ridder and Pfajfar (2016:30)5, on the other hand conclude that : “ that monetary policy shocks 
aﬀect state-level unemployment and output only if wages are rigid.”  Further, their estimates not 
only point to the evidence “that states with high rigidities experience signiﬁcantly greater output 
reductions and unemployment increases after an interest rate shock than states with low rigidities, 
but that multipliers of ﬁscal spending shocks are considerably larger in states with high wage 
rigidities than states with low rigidities.” 
 
Vlieghe is a proponent of the argument that “the unemployment rate is still an important driver of 
wages, - given the necessity of other considerations.” 
 
Five different factors that, in his, opinion, may have been keeping wage growth low despite falling 
unemployment  are as follows (2018:13): 
 
1) Change in the structural unemployment rate – under which further sub headings, 
namely attributable causes of these, are addressed, namely: 
- - i) the UK workforce is ageing and has a higher education attainment now than in the past, 
which would lead to a lower equilibrium unemployment rate as older and more highly 
educated workers tend to spend less time out of work; 
-  
- -ii)  Tax and benefit changes might have increased the incentives to find work, which would 
also lead to less time spent in unemployment; 
-  
- -iii) Changes to work patterns such as increased part-time work and zero hours contracts  
that may mean that the unemployment rate is a less reliable guide to overall slack in the 
labour market, because such workers can find themselves underemployed even if they have 
a job. 
 
He adds (2018:15), that the above considerations may imply that “the unemployment rate can fall 
further than it did in the past before pushing up wages.” 
2) Public sector wage restraint: To which it is furthermore observed that  “ in the recovery, 
public sector wage growth has remained generally below private sector wage growth, and 
public sector employment has contracted.” 
                                                          
4
 See ibid 
5
 M. De Ridder and.D. Pfajfar (2016) .Policy Shocks and Wage Rigidities: Empirical Evidence from Regional 
Eﬀects of National Shocks at page 30 
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3) The “lingering effect” of downward nominal wage rigidity. 
4) Weak inflation expectations 
5) Productivity growth 
 
In concluding, he not only accentuates his argument that the Philips Curve is still very relevant 
and applicable (2018:18), but also observes that the first four factors “keep overall inflationary 
pressures down for a given unemployment rate, i.e. both wage and price inflation” whilst the fifth, 
namely, weak productivity, does not – by drawing attention to the point that “Weaker productivity 
growth implies weaker wage growth for the same inflationary pressure.” 
 
In contrast, Daly (2019:4) argues that there are new forms of wage compensation which are not 
being accounted for6 under traditional measures used to track wages and salaries and consequently, 
this “ creates a wedge between the strong labor market we observe and our available indicators of 
wage growth.” 
In drawing attention to the reliability of economic indicators as measures of economic activity, a 
further and unlikely source of the “weakening the link between economic activity and inflation” is 
referred to, by way of “the Fed Wedge”, namely, a phenomenon attributed to the weakening link 
between economic activity and inflation – impacted by the Federal Reserve’s inflation target  
function of adjusting interest rates correspondingly to levels of inflation.  
She concludes that “When the Federal Reserve is doing its job well, the link between economic 
activity and inflation is weaker – as is the case today -  the essence of the “Fed wedge.” 7  
 
In view of the recognition that existing monetary policy kit may have to be expanded, reference 
has been made to further tools which had to be deployed to facilitate monetary policy objectives – 
particularly in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, namely, an adjustment of its monetary policy 
tools through the federal funds rate. In particular :8 
- The FOMC’s primary means of changing the stance of monetary policy is by adjusting its 
target range for the federal funds rate; 
- The FOMC cut that target to just above zero in response to financial turmoil and 
deteriorating economic conditions in December 2008; 
                                                          
6
 “Free transportation, flexible workweeks, unlimited time off, and help with things like student loan repayment and 
even housing, which have become meaningful part of employee compensation packages.” See page 4 
7
 ibid 
8
 See Remarks by Richard H. Clarida , Vice Chair Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at “The Bank 
of Finland Conference on Monetary Policy and Future of EMU [Economic and Monetary Union]” Helsinki, Finland 
at page 9. “The FOMC altered the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet through a sequence of three large-
scale securities purchase programs, via a maturity extension program, and by adjusting the reinvestment of principal 
payments on maturing securities.” 
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- Since the U.S. economy required additional policy accommodation after the ELB was 
reached;  
- the FOMC deployed two additional tools in the years following the crisis:  balance sheet 
policies and forward guidance about the likely path of the federal funds rate.” 
 
Global Developments Which have altered the Current Financial Landscape  
According to reports by the Bank for International Settlements,9 “ two factors in particular, 
amongst several other factors,  have contributed to low wage growth – as well as “long-term forces 
behind labour’s declining pricing power”, namely: 
 
- i) “The dramatic expansion of the global labour force: In the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
opening-up of Asia and the former Soviet bloc roughly doubled the effective labour force 
involved in world trade and more recently, further economic integration and increasing 
participation in GVCs have boosted international competition in labour markets. 
 
- ii) industrial automation. New technologies have long been a significant influence on 
production processes and demand for skilled labour in advanced economies. With the 
quickening pace and growing versatility of current robotic technologies, manufacturing 
labour pools face new challenges. At the same time, service sector employment, 
traditionally less exposed to the increased efficiency of robotics, has also become more 
vulnerable. 
 
-  
Financial Cycle Risks and Financial Cycle Indicators 
The prominent role assumed by financial indicators which are geared towards detecting financial 
cycle busts, is further highlighted by the BIS – who also suggest that “main cause of the next 
recession will perhaps resemble more closely that of the latest one – a financial cycle bust” – with 
reference to the fact that “the recessions in the early 1990s in a number of advanced economies, 
without approaching the depth and breadth of the latest one, had already begun to exhibit similar 
features: they had been preceded by outsize increases in credit and property prices, which collapsed 
once monetary policy started to tighten, leading to financial and banking strains.”10  
                                                          
9
 BIS (2017). “Exploring the Wage Phillips curve”, Bank for International Settlements 87th Annual Report, Box IV.A. 
at page 64 
 
10 BIS (2017). BIS 87th Annual Report at pages 11 and 12. “….for EMEs, financial crises linked to financial cycle 
busts have been quite prominent, often triggered or amplified by the loss of external funding; recall, for instance, the 
Asian crisis some 20 years ago.  
Leading indicators of financial distress constructed along the above lines do point to potential risks (Chapter III). 
Admittedly, such risks are not apparent in the countries at the core of the GFC, where domestic financial booms 
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The variation in financial cycles between different countries is furthermore, illustrate by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS,2017:12) : 
 
- Financial cycles in this group occur at different stages. In some cases, such as China, the 
booms are continuing and maturing; in others, such as Brazil, they have already turned to 
bust and recessions have occurred, although without ushering in a full-blown financial 
crisis.” 
 
It (BIS, 2017: 13) also adds that whilst  interest rates matter for investment, a bigger role is played 
by profits, uncertainty and cash flows. 
 
In addition to financial cycle risks, references are also made by the BIS (2017: 28-30) to “the 
changing nature of market risks” – a phenomenon which is referred to, not only by way of shifts 
in a number of relationships which had been characteristic of the markets over the years, but also 
exemplified by reference to shifts in the fall in correlations of asset returns across sectors and 
regions; and the growing divergence between measures of market risk and of policy uncertainty. 
 
Rise in level of Protectionist Risks11 
This is evidenced by recent ongoing trade wars, potential for increased retaliatory measures 
between major advanced trading economies, blocs and partners, as well as recent introduction of 
digital tax on major tech firms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
collapsed, such as the United States, the United Kingdom or Spain. There, some private sector deleveraging has taken 
place and financial cycle expansions are still comparatively young. The main source of near-term concerns in crisis-
hit economies is the failure to fully repair banks’ balance sheets in some countries, notably in parts of the euro area, 
especially where the public sector’s own balance sheet looks fragile (Chapter V). Political uncertainties compound 
these concerns. Rather, the classical signs of financial cycle risks are apparent in several countries largely spared by 
the GFC, which saw financial expansions gather pace in its aftermath. This group comprises several EMEs, including 
the largest, as well as a number of advanced economies, notably some commodity exporters buoyed by the long post-
crisis commodity boom. In all of these economies, of course, interest rates have been very low, or even negative, as 
inflation has stayed low, or even given way to deflation, despite strong economic performance.” 
11
  See BIS (2017).at pages 53 -55;  
See also WSJ, “Facebook, Google May Face Billions in New Taxes Across Asia, Latin America”  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/countries-push-digital-taxes-on-tech-giants-1540742400?mod=article_inline 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Hence in the event that the link between economic activity and inflation has become weaker, as 
evidenced by recent figures, what options exist for federal regulators, as well as national regulatory 
authorities across the globe?  
The need for greater reliance on macro prudential policy tools – intended to serve as complements 
to monetary policies, becomes the more likely point of focus. Since the introduction of the Basel 
leverage ratios in 2010, supplementary leverage ratios, enhanced supplementary leverage ratios, 
liquidity standards – as evidenced by the Net Stable Funding Ratio and the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio – in addition to a more robust risk capital adequacy framework which incorporates 
countercyclical, conservative buffers – and greater focus on globally active systemic institutions 
(GSIBs), as some of its key objectives, serves to ensure that periods requiring greater 
accommodative monetary policies, do not unduly compel federal and national regulators to resort 
merely to monetary policy tools, but also to Core PCE inflation, which is considered to “exclude 
consumer food and energy prices that are often quite volatile, and therefore, typically provides a 
better indication than the total measure of where overall inflation will be in the future.” , the 
trimmed mean PCE price index, survey based measures of inflation – which are considered to be 
more reliable than market based measures; as well as macro prudential policy tools. 
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BIS (2017), “Exploring the Wage Phillips curve”, Bank for International Settlements 87th 
Annual Report 
And particularly pages 62 -68 
Source:BIS (2017) BIS  87th Annual Report at page 11 
 
Tighter labour markets pointing to upside inflation risks? Graph I.3 As unemployment falls, wage pressures rise1 While 
wages remain sensitive to unemployment, prices 
are not4 
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economies. See Chapter IV for details. 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; OECD, Economic Outlook; BIS estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial cycle risks 
“In light of the above, the potential role of financial cycle risks comes to the 
fore. The main cause of the next recession will perhaps resemble more closely 
that of the latest one – a financial cycle bust. In fact, the recessions in the early 
1990s in a number of advanced economies, without approaching the depth 
and breadth of the latest one, had already begun to exhibit similar 
features: they had been preceded by outsize increases in credit and property 
prices, which collapsed once monetary policy started to tighten, leading to 
financial and banking strains. And for EMEs, financial crises linked to financial 
cycle busts have been quite prominent, often triggered or amplified by the loss 
of external funding; recall, for instance, the Asian crisis some 20 years ago. 
Leading indicators of financial distress constructed along the above lines 
do point to potential risks (Chapter III). Admittedly, such risks are not apparent in 
the countries at the core of the GFC, where domestic financial booms collapsed, 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom or Spain. There, some private 
sector deleveraging has taken place and financial cycle expansions are still 
comparatively young. The main source of near-term concerns in crisis-hit 
economies is the failure to fully repair banks’ balance sheets in some countries, 
notably in parts of the euro area, especially where the public sector’s own balance 
sheet looks fragile (Chapter V). Political uncertainties compound these 
concerns. 
Rather, the classical signs of financial cycle risks are apparent in several 
countries largely spared by the GFC, which saw financial expansions gather pace 
in its aftermath. This group comprises several EMEs, including the largest, as well 
as a number of advanced economies, notably some commodity exporters 
buoyed by the long post-crisis commodity boom. In all of these economies, of 
course, interest rates have been very low, or even negative, as inflation has 
stayed low, or even given way to deflation, despite strong economic 
performance. Financial cycles in this group are at different stages. In some 
cases, such as China, the booms are continuing and maturing; in others, such 
as Brazil, they have already turned to bust and recessions have occurred, 
although without ushering in a full-blown financial crisis. 
EMEs face an additional challenge: the comparatively large amount of FX 
debt, mainly in US dollars (Chapters III, V and VI). Dollar debt has typically 
played a critical role in EME financial crises in the past, either as a trigger, such as 
when gross dollar-denominated capital flows reversed, or as an amplifier. The 
conjunction of a domestic currency depreciation and higher US dollar interest rates 
can be poisonous in the presence of large currency mismatches. From 2009 to 
end-2016, US dollar credit to non-banks located outside the United States – a 
bellwether BIS indicator of global liquidity – soared by around 50% to some 
$10.5 trillion; for those in EMEs alone, it more than doubled, to $3.6 trillion. 
Compared with the past, several factors mitigate the risk linked to FX 
debt. Countries have adopted more flexible exchange rate regimes: while no 
panacea, these should make currency crashes less likely and induce less FX 
risk-taking ex ante. Countries have also built up foreign currency war chests, which 
should cushion the blow if strains emerge. And the amounts of FX debt in 
relation to GDP are, on balance, still not as high as before previous financial 
crises. Indeed, several countries have absorbed large exchange rate 
adjustments in recent years. Even so, vulnerabilities should not be taken 
lightly, at least where large amounts of FX debt coincide with outsize domestic 
financial booms. This is one reason why a tightening of US monetary policy and 
a US dollar appreciation may signal global financial market retrenchment 
and higher risk aversion, with the dollar acting as a kind of “fear gauge”.2 
 
 
 Transitory inflation headwinds ease and deflation risks fade 
In per cent Graph IV.4 
Global headline-core gap closes1 Oil price and FX effects moderate2 Deflation risks fall sharply4 
yoy changes 
 
80 
 
60 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
07 09 
 
 
 
11 13 
 
 
 
15 17 
 
 
 
CH EA 
 
 
 
SE US 
20 
 
   0 
GB   CA JP 
Inflation: Headline Core CPI 
Exchange rate 
Oil price 
Other3 
2015 2016 2017 
1 Consumer prices; weighted averages based on rolling GDP and PPP exchange rates. 2 Based on the model in M Jašová, R Moessner and 
E Takáts, “Exchange rate pass-through: what has changed since the crisis?”, BIS Working Papers, no 583, September 2016, using an unbalanced 
panel of nine AEs and 16 EMEs. 3 Inflation developments not explained by the oil price or exchange rate. 4 Deflation tail probabilities 
estimated from the distribution of historical forecast errors collected from up to 20 years of survey data. 
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In spite of the reflation, long-run inflation expectations remained well 
anchored. As in earlier years, survey-based measures ran well within most central 
banks’ target ranges (Graph IV.5, right-hand panel). In addition, market-based 
measures of long-run inflation expectations recovered somewhat from lows in the 
previous year, suggesting that concerns about deflation risks have faded. As 
discussed in the 86th Annual Report, questions were raised about the reliability of 
these market measures, owing to significant time-varying liquidity and term premia 
as well as an undue sensitivity to short-term oil price fluctuations (Chapter II). 
Nevertheless, central banks took some comfort in seeing these measures turn 
upwards. 
Despite the moderate near-term and cyclical reflationary forces at work, secular 
factors, such as globalisation and technology, seemingly continued to work in the 
opposite direction. The 86th Annual Report raised the possibility that improvements 
in technology and expanding global value chains (GVCs) have held down price 
pressures in past decades. These supply side forces generate “good” disinflationary 
headwinds. The levelling-off of globalisation in recent years, as documented in 
Chapter VI, has raised the question whether the headwinds have moderated, possibly 
contributing to the upward tilt in the inflation outlook. 
 
Are labour markets signalling rising inflationary pressures? 
Global labour markets have seen profound changes over the past decades, with 
significant implications for wage and price formation. As labour market slack 
diminishes, wage growth is expected to rise. But wage demands have lagged the 
cycle more than in the past. Rather than a purely cyclical phenomenon, this wage 
behaviour appears to reflect long-term forces that are reshaping the global 
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 Labour markets tighten, producer prices pick up as long-term inflation 
expectations remain well anchored 
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economy. The question for many central banks is whether these developments 
have so weakened the relationship between inflation and labour market slack 
that the recent tightening of labour markets poses little threat of an inflation 
overshoot. 
 
Long-term forces behind labour’s declining pricing power 
Subdued wage growth is a sign of labour’s declining “pricing” power. While a number 
of factors have contributed to this development, two deserve special attention. 
One factor has been the dramatic expansion of the global labour force. In the 
1990s and early 2000s, the opening-up of Asia and the former Soviet bloc roughly 
doubled the effective labour force involved in world trade.1 More recently, further 
economic integration and increasing participation in GVCs have boosted 
international competition in labour markets. 
A second factor has been industrial automation. New technologies have long 
been a significant influence on production processes and demand for skilled labour 
in advanced economies. With the quickening pace and growing versatility of 
current robotic technologies, manufacturing labour pools face new challenges. At 
the same time, service sector employment, traditionally less exposed to the 
increased efficiency of robotics, has also become more vulnerable. Automating 
knowledge work through software advances and new information technologies has 
continued to boost the size and scope of global service providers, broadening the 
range of service jobs that are threatened with obsolescence.2 
Labour’s lower pricing power is consistent with the decline in labour’s income 
share in many advanced economies (Graph IV.6, left-hand panel). And it may 
also help explain why wages have not always kept up with productivity trends 
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 Globalisation and technology have been driving secular labour market trends1 Graph IV.6 
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(Graph IV.6, right-hand panel). At the same time, of course, these trends have not 
affected all sectors equally, and reflect a multiplicity of other factors, too.3 
 
Implications for wage growth and inflation 
These profound changes in labour markets may also have far-reaching implications 
for inflation. One reason why labour markets have traditionally been regarded as 
key for inflation is that wage increases lead to rising production costs and hence 
higher prices, which may in turn reinforce wage demands – so-called second-round 
effects. After all, wage costs account for the bulk of production costs, especially in 
the service sector. The more workers can strengthen their pricing power, the more 
likely it is that wage demands will be accommodated. Thus, a secular decline in 
pricing power can shed light on the question of how far the recent tightening of 
global labour markets points to a build-up in inflation momentum. 
Analysing this question requires a number of links to be considered: the 
relationship between wage pressures and production costs, ie unit labour costs 
(ULCs); that between labour costs and measures of economic slack; and finally that 
between ULCs and inflation. The picture that emerges is a mixed one. 
Wage growth is not necessarily inflationary: whenever it is supported by 
productivity gains, it will not lead to rising production costs. This is why ULC growth 
is a better, if still imperfect, measure of incipient inflationary pressures. At the current 
juncture, advanced economy ULCs are expected be held in check by somewhat faster 
productivity growth, despite stronger earnings growth (Graph IV.7, left-hand panel). 
There is also some evidence that the link between ULC growth and domestic 
labour market slack has weakened over the years (centre panel in Graph IV.7), but 
remains significant. The secular decline in labour’s pricing power appears to have 
played a role (Box IV.A). Other evidence points to the real economy’s globalisation 
as a force behind this decline: a country’s ULC growth has become more correlated 
with global ULC growth, weighted by the country’s value added trade (Box IV.B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This also suggests that an exclusive focus on domestic developments could 
underestimate inflationary pressures, now that ULCs are rising globally. 
The consequences of ULC developments for prices are somewhat less clear. To 
be sure, ULC growth and inflation appear to co-move closely in the long run.4 In 
addition, there is evidence of a link at cyclical frequencies (Graph IV.7, right-hand 
panel). That said, the link has become weaker and has been, at times, unstable and 
elusive. Given the predictive content of ULC growth for future price inflation, the 
empirical evidence points to a weak pass-through of labour costs to inflation.5 This 
impression is reinforced by the difficulties in finding a significant response of inflation 
to domestic output or labour slack – the price Philips curve looks rather flat.6 
Since the GFC, a number of factors may have clouded the picture further. Some 
of them suggest that underlying wage cost pressures may have been overestimated. 
For instance, previously discouraged workers may have re-entered the labour force 
and hence expanded the ranks of job-seekers (officially unemployed), suggesting 
that more slack may exist in the labour market than headline figures indicate. 
Indeed, over the past decade not all of the decline in the participation rate in some 
countries can be attributed to secular demographic trends, such as ageing.7 
Other factors may have weakened the relationship between slack and wage 
growth only temporarily. Wage gains may have been unusually weak simply 
because of the depth of the recession and nominal wage rigidities.8 With inflation 
having eroded real wage gains since then, wage pressure might revive if inflation 
continues to increase as slack diminishes. For instance, wage norms, which provide 
an orientation for such demands, fell to roughly 2% post-crisis, well below the 3–4% 
that was typical pre-crisis.9 Indeed, early signs of such a return are visible in the 
more cyclically sensitive sectors, eg the rise in part-time wage growth. 
 
 
Cyclical ULC developments around the globe may pose upside risk to inflation Graph IV.7 
ULC growth in AEs1  Falling unemployment rates point 
to a further pickup in ULC growth4 
Rising ULC growth historically 
correlated with higher inflation7 
Per cent Correlation coefficient 
 
2.4 
 
1.2 
 
0.0 
 
–1.2 
 
–2.4 
 
–3.6 
06 08 10 12 14 16 18 –2 0 2 4 
/ Unit labour cost growth2 Unemployment gap, % pts
6 
/ Compensation/hours worked 
/ Labour productivity (inverse)3 
Before 1985 Since 1985 Since 1985 1985–2006 
1 Weighted averages based on rolling GDP and PPP exchange rates; forecasts after 2015. 2 Compensation of employees per real 
GDP. 3 Total number of hours worked per real GDP. 4 G7 economies; quarterly data from Q1 1970 to Q3 2016. A few outliers exceeding 
15% in absolute value were omitted from the graph but included in the regression analysis. Estimated slopes are equal to –1.6119 and –0.5471 
with robust p-values of 0.008 and 0.003, respectively. 5 See Box IV.A for details. 6 Unemployment rate less NAIRU. 7 Contemporaneous 
cross-correlations of quarterly ULC growth and inflation (measured by the GDP price deflator), less four-quarter moving average of changes 
in the GDP price deflator, aggregated at annual frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d
ju
s
te
d
 U
L
C
 g
ro
w
th
, 
%
 p
ts
5
 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; OECD, Economic Outlook; BIS calculations. 
 Exploring the wage Phillips curve 
Box IV.A 
 
Ever since William Phillips published his seminal paper in 1958, a wide body of research has emphasised the role 
of economic slack in driving inflation in prices and wages. However, recent evidence suggests that the ability of 
price Phillips curves to explain inflation has declined (see Chapter III of the 84th Annual Report). What about the 
impact of economic slack on wages? 
A conventional wage Phillips curve specification embodies the view that unit labour cost (ULC) growth (wage 
inflation, wi,t , adjusted for labour productivity growth, lpi,t ) is driven by labour market slack, xi,t with a sensitivity 
β: 
(6wi,t — 6lpi,t) = k + ci + n¯i,t–1 + þxi,t + ei,t . 
 
For a G7 panel from 1960 to 2016, the relationship between ULC growth and slack (proxied by the unemployment 
gap (Graph IV.A, right-hand panel)) is found to be negative and statistically significant. The estimate of β indicates 
that a 1 percentage point decline in slack increases ULC growth by roughly 0.9 percentage points (red line, Graph IV.A, 
left-hand panel). 
One possible driver of a changing sensitivity of ULCs to slack conditions is the increased contestability of 
markets associated with the trend decline in workers’ pricing power. To explore this possibility, a measure of pricing 
power (denoted zi,t ) is constructed by applying the method of principal components to changes in three indicators 
of relevant labour market conditions: employment protection, union coverage and union density (Graph IV.A, centre 
panel). An augmented Phillips curve model is then estimated, where the sensitivity of ULC growth to slack conditions, 
βi,t depends on each country’s zi,t : 
(6wi,t — 6lpi,t) = k + ci + n¯i,t–1 + þi,txi,t + ei,t , with þi,t  = þ(1 + yzi,t). 
 
The estimated parameter γ is positive and significant, indicating that the lower pricing power has indeed 
reduced the sensitivity of ULCs to domestic labour slack – the average slope of the wage Phillips curve has become 
flatter across countries (blue line, Graph IV.A, left-hand panel). Even so, the time-varying Phillips curve slope has 
 
Wage Phillips curves still relevant Graph IV.A 
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All told, these considerations point to some reflationary tilt in the inflation 
outlook but not to major inflationary risks. At the same time, domestic and global 
labour market conditions deserve close monitoring, as purely domestic indicators 
of slack, be it in the labour or goods markets, do not appear to be fully adequate in 
gauging inflationary pressures.10 
 
Start of the Great Unwinding? 
Policy normalisation has never been a question of “if” but rather of “when, how fast 
and to what level”. These questions gained prominence in the past year, as the case 
for prolonged accommodation weakened and several central banks turned their 
attention to the process of normalisation. Currently, markets expect rates to rise 
very gradually (Graph IV.8, left-hand panel), as bloated central bank balance sheets 
are trimmed. Yet such expectations contrast sharply with past episodes of rising 
rates, which were typically much less gradual (Graph IV.8, second panel). 
In determining the pace of normalisation, central banks must indeed strike a 
delicate balance. On the one hand, there is a risk of acting too early and too rapidly. 
After a series of false dawns in the global economy, questions linger about the 
durability of this upswing. And the unprecedented period of ultra-low rates heightens 
uncertainty about reactions in financial markets and the economy. On the other 
hand, there is a risk of acting too late and too gradually. If central banks fall behind 
the curve, they may at some point need to tighten more abruptly and intensively to 
keep the economy from overheating and inflation from overshooting. And even if 
inflation does not rise, keeping interest rates too low for long could raise financial 
stability and macroeconomic risks further down the road, as debt continues to pile 
up and risk-taking in financial markets gathers steam. How policymakers address 
these trade-offs will be critical for the prospects of a sustainable expansion. 
Views about the end-point and initial economic conditions will naturally 
influence the shape and pace of the normalisation process. It is worth considering 
in more detail the issues that each of these aspects raises. 
A key question about the end-point is the level towards which the policy rate 
should be expected to gravitate. Central banks use a number of approaches to form 
a judgment about this, rather than simply extrapolating the decline in rates over 
time (Graph IV.8, third panel). One approach is to interpret what financial markets 
are pricing in, by deriving from bond yields what “markets think” the appropriate 
rate will be in the future (Chapter II). Another is to use modelling tools to estimate 
the end-point, defined as the “equilibrium” interest rate that balances the economy 
– sometimes also known as the “natural rate”.11 Both approaches would generally 
point to real (inflation-adjusted) short-term rates in the region of 0 to 2%. With the 
addition of target inflation of around 2%, this results in nominal rates of between 2 
and 4%.12 Alternative yardsticks, for example, based on the trend in global per 
remained statistically significant, indicating that tighter labour markets continue to lift ULC growth, albeit by 
somewhat less than in the past. Taken at face value, the slope flattened from around 1.1 in 1974 to 0.6 in 2014. 
 
 A Phillips, “The relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957”, 
Economica, vol 25, no 100, November 1958.  Each country’s unemployment rate less its NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment); in the panel regression, k is a constant, ci is a country fixed effect, ei,t is an error term and π˗ i,t–1   is an inflation expectation 
proxy (measured by a four-quarter change in the GDP price deflator; see eg A Atkeson and L Ohanian, “Are Phillips curves useful for 
forecasting inflation?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Winter 2001). 
  
